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Abstract
Small  firms  are  thought  to  encounter  various  difficulties  implementing  strategic
alliances.  Due  to  these  problems,  they  may  be  less  able  to  reap  the  benefits  of  alliance
adaptation, and the changes that occur in alliances over time often will not coincide with the
small firm’s interests. The evidence we present on contractual renegotiations in alliances
suggests that small firms are no more or less likely to experience contractual changes in
general. However, small firms tend to bear inefficiencies of two kinds in their collaborations.
They  are  less  likely  to  adapt  alliances  in  the  presence  of  governance  misalignments.
Furthermore,  they  are  prone  to  make  greater  transaction-specific  investments  without
commensurate  contractual  safeguards,  which  can  lead  to  ex post hold-up  in  the  form  of
contractual renegotiations.
Keywords:  Strategic  Alliances,  Entrepreneurial  Firms,  Small  Firms,  Contractual
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Introduction
Strategic alliances hold out numerous potential benefits for small firms, including
the ability to tap into new markets, access scale economies, obtain complementary resources
in  under-developed  value  chain  activities,  respond  to  environmental  uncertainties,  and
receive  endorsements  from  reputable  incumbents,  among  others  (e.g.,  D’Souza  &
McDougall, 1989; Deed & Hill, 1996; Dickson & Weaver, 1997; Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven,
1996; Gomes-Casseres, 1997; Hara & Kanai, 1994; Larson, 1991; Shan, 1990; Stuart, Hoang,
& Hybels, 1999). It is equally clear, however, that small firms commonly encounter their
share  of  challenges  in  formulating  and  implementing  a  collaborative  strategy.  Examples
include  maintaining  a  purpose  that  complements  their  partners’  and  building  a  workable
interface  with  collaborators  (Doz,  1988).  Often,  due  to  their  lack  of  financial  or  other
resources,  bargaining  power,  or  collaborative  experience,  small  firms  find  that  strategic
alliances fail to meet their expectations (e.g., Alvarez & Barney, 2001).
In attempting to understand firms’ experiences with alliances, it is worth beginning
with the observation that the value that a firm ultimately derives, or fails to derive, from a
collaborative agreement hinges upon the firm’s management of a number of distinct, yet
interrelated, stages. These stages include scanning for partners and selecting one, negotiating
the alliance and establishing its design, implementing the agreement and possibly changing it
over time, and finally terminating the alliance in one of several ways (e.g., Ring & Van de
Ven 1994; Zajac & Olsen, 1993). By considering the unique challenges and attributes of
small firms in alliances, as well as the managerial requirements of each of these stages of
collaboration, it is possible to obtain a richer understanding of the obstacles and opportunities
that small firms face in alliances. 
Nevertheless, despite the wealth of research on strategic alliances, comparatively
little work has considered the post-formation stages of collaboration. In recent years, more
research has gone on to analyze alliance termination rather than just alliance formation (e.g.,
Park & Kim, 1997), but the events and collaborative dynamics preceding termination have
gone relatively unexplored in empirical research (e.g., Ariño & de la Torre, 1998). However,
it is likely that in these stages of collaboration entrepreneurial firms will face significant
challenges  in  managing  their  collaborative  relationships  effectively  (Niederkofler,  1991).
Indeed, Doz and Hamel (1998) argue that how firms manage an alliance over time will be a
Note: In developing this research, we have benefited from discussions with Peter Ring and Maurizio Zollo.  We
gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the Anselmo Rubiralta Center for Research on Globalization
and Strategy at IESE.more  important  determinant  of  the  alliance’s  ultimate  success  or  failure  than  how  the
collaboration  was  initially  set  up.  Other  researchers  have  similarly  acknowledged  the
importance  of  the  dynamic  aspects  of  collaborative  processes  (e.g.,  Deeds  &  Hill,  1999;
Egelhoff & Haklisch, 1994; Larson, 1992; Weaver & Dickson, 1998).
In this paper, we examine contractual renegotiation as one type of post-formation
change in strategic alliances. Our specific objective is to bring transaction cost theory into the
post-formation  setting  and  examine  the  experiences  of  small  firms  in  collaborative
relationships as they evolve. This is important because existing empirical research that draws
upon  transaction  cost  theory  has  tended  to  assess  firms’  governance  choices  under  the
assumption  that  a  selection  environment  acts  to  weed  out  inefficient  structures  before
managers have the opportunity to adapt them (e.g., Williamson, 1991). By contrast, we allow
for managerial discretion to remedy alliances subject to governance misalignment, but for
several reasons we also suspect that smaller firms will be less able to use contractual changes
and refine their alliances’ governance. We also consider the possibility that smaller firms will
be  more  exposed  to  the  hazards  of  hold-up  in  alliances,  as  manifested  in  contractual
renegotiations.  By  analyzing  the  extent  to  which  small  and  other  firms  differ  in  their
propensity to renegotiate alliances in general or due to more specific reasons such as these,
we are able to isolate some of the particular mechanisms behind alliance dynamics as they
are experienced uniquely by entrepreneurial firms.
The paper proceeds as follows: In the next section, we discuss in greater depth the
challenges small firms face in managing the dynamics of alliances. Hypotheses are developed
that  relate  firm  size  and  attributes  of  the  alliance  to  the  likelihood  of  contractual
renegotiation. The following section offers details on the research design. In brief, the present
study  contrasts  recent  qualitative  research  on  alliance  evolution  by  using  econometric
analysis  to  study  the  incidence  and  antecedents  of  contractual  renegotiations  in  strategic
alliances by relying on a survey of collaborative agreements formed by Spanish firms. The
empirical evidence follows. Multivariate results demonstrate that small firms are no more or
less likely to renegotiate alliances than other firms. However, the evidence suggests that
smaller firms are less likely to adapt their alliances in the face of governance misalignment
and  its  attendant  inefficiencies.  Smaller  firms  tend  to  make  higher  levels  of  transaction-
specific investment in alliances without restricting partners through additional contractual
safeguards,  which  triggers  contractual  changes  in  alliances.  Implications  and  avenues  for
future research conclude.
Theory and hypotheses
The Evolution of Small Firms’ Alliances
Contractual changes in alliances may be viewed alternatively as an outcome of a
collaborative relationship or as a specific post-formation governance decision made by a
partner. When viewed as an outcome of the collaboration, several considerations suggest that
contractual renegotiations may be expected to be more likely for small firms. First, such
firms typically lack extensive alliance experience, which otherwise may allow firms to set up
alliances  effectively  ex ante in  response  to  features  of  the  interfirm  exchange,  thereby
avoiding the need for ex post adjustments. Extensive alliance experience may also enable a
firm  to  anticipate  some  of  the  contingencies  that  might  arise  after  the  alliance  has  been
established. Second, due to the lower bargaining power of small firms, contractual changes
may also be thrust upon them by their partners, particularly as firms learn from one another
2(e.g., Alvarez & Barney, 2001). Third, Zacharakis (1997) develops the argument that because
less  information  tends  to  be  available  on  smaller  firms,  they  have  an  incentive  to
misrepresent their abilities in their collaborations. Once their true capabilities are recognized
over time, alliance adjustments may follow. Finally, contractual changes in alliances may also
stem from a small firm’s financial constraints and the resulting allocation of control rights.
Specifically, Lerner and Merges (1998) suggest that a small firm’s lack of financial resources
can contribute to a suboptimal allocation of control rights when the alliance is established.
Their empirical analysis indicates that exogenous changes in the availability of funds for the
small firm lead to subsequent shifts in control rights in alliances.
However, if contractual changes are viewed as decisions or actions taken by the
firm,  it  becomes  less  clear  if  small  firms  will  be  more  likely  to  engage  in  contractual
renegotiations.  This  is  because  such  decisions  or  actions  depend  not  only  on  the  firm’s
willingness to take them, but also on their ability to do so. For instance, contrary to the
argument above, collaborative experience may facilitate ex post adjustments in alliances by
enabling the firm to know when such changes are warranted and how to go about adapting
the alliance. Thus, the tendency of smaller firms to have lower levels of alliance experience
suggests that they may be less likely to take such actions when they are needed. Additionally,
their lower bargaining power in a relationship also suggests that such changes may in practice
be  difficult  to  effect.  These  considerations  lead  us  to  specify  the  following  competing
hypotheses for the sake of completeness:
Hypothesis 1a: The likelihood of contractual renegotiation will be higher for small
firms than others.
Hypothesis  1b: The likelihood of contractual renegotiation will be lower for small
firms than others.
Although  we  wish  to  test  the  overall  effects  of  firm  size  on  the  likelihood  of
contractual  changes  in  alliances,  the  competing  arguments  noted  above  indicate  the
importance of understanding the contingencies that lead to contractual renegotiations. That is,
they point to the need for a theory of contractual renegotiations in strategic alliances that is
able to disentangle some of the alternative assertions and examine whether the experiences of
small firms are truly unique.
Below we discuss two explanations for contractual renegotiations in alliances, as
identified  by  transaction  cost  theory.  First,  firms  may  renegotiate  an  alliance  to  alleviate
inefficiencies stemming from the initial design of the collaborative agreement if it does not
suit the realities of the exchange relationship. The greater the inefficiencies arising from
governance misalignment, the greater the incentive to bear the costs of renegotiation to adjust
the alliance’s governance. Second, a firm may be willing to renegotiate an alliance when it
has made significant transaction-specific investment in an alliance and its partner recognizes
the opportunity to hold-up the firm and appropriate this value. Contractual renegotiation, in
this case, may reflect the presence of contractual hazards and ex post haggling.
While the first explanation implies that contractual renegotiations in alliances can be
efficiency enhancing, in the second instance a transfer of value occurs between the parties
and  inefficiency  can  be  exacerbated  in  the  process  of  renegotiating  the  collaborative
agreement’s terms. Two questions arise: Are small firms more or less able to obtain the
efficiencies from responding to governance misalignment? and Are small firms more or less
susceptible to contractual hazards that bring forth contractual renegotiations to appropriate
value? Based on the discussion above, it is plausible that small firms will be less able to reap
3the benefits of alliance adaptation, and that the changes that do occur in alliances over time
often will not coincide with the small firm’s interests. We consider each of these possibilities
in turn in the next two sections.
Governance Misalignment and Contractual Renegotiation
Because our goal is to extend transaction cost theory into the post-formation setting,
it  is  important  to  point  out  two  related  propositions  and  assumptions  that  help  in  the
development of research hypotheses. First, a fundamental tenet of transaction cost theory
concerns ‘discriminating alignment,’ which maintains that the efficiency of a transaction will
be  positively  related  to  the  alignment  between  the  chosen  governance  structure  (and  the
syndrome of properties it represents) and the fundamental attributes of the transaction and
the broader  contracting  environment  (Williamson,  1991).  Thus,  transaction  cost  theory
provides a contingent perspective arguing that no one governance structure is universally
more or less efficient than others; rather, governance forms ranging from market-mediated
exchange to hybrids to full internalization are efficient under certain circumstances.
Second, and closely related to the proposition of discriminating alignment, empirical
research using transaction cost theory tends to use a selection approach to fit (e.g., Drazin &
Van de Ven, 1985), whereby efficiency implications are drawn from reduced-form models of
firms’ governance choices. This is made possible by the assumption that competitive forces
in  the  selection  environment  weed  out  inefficient  governance  decisions.  It  is  plausible,
however, that misaligned transactions may exist and even persist (e.g., Argyres & Libeskind,
1999). In studying ex post contractual changes in alliances, it is helpful for us to relax this
assumption to allow for managerial discretion, which potentially enables firms to refine an
alliance’s  governance  before  a  maladapted  collaborative  relationship  is  selected  out  by
competitive forces.
More precisely, inefficiencies generated by two types of governance misalignment
may prompt firms to renegotiate their collaborative relationships. First, it is possible that
‘excessive’ governance was put in place for a comparatively simple exchange relationship.
For instance, if alternative partners are available and a firm commits generic resources that
can  be  readily  redeployed,  a  simple  contract  may  be  used  to  govern  the  alliance.  The
incentives and controls provided by equity are not needed as the threat of opportunism and its
implied risks are minimal. When firms use excessive governance instead, however, the result
can be politicized or slow decision-making (Williamson, 1991).
Second, inefficiencies may arise if ‘insufficient’ governance is put in place for a
more complex collaborative relationship. This case is the mirror image of the one noted
above.  Here,  inadequate  governance  mechanisms  are  instituted  when  the  threat  of
opportunism is high. As an illustration, a firm using a non-equity arrangement to govern a
commitment-intensive alliance with an R&D component and broad scope may be exposed to
contractual  hazards  such  as  hold-up  and  moral  hazard  (e.g.,  Oxley,  1997).    In  such
circumstances,  parties’  rights  and  obligations  can  be  very  difficult  to  specify  up  front,
monitoring  and  control  are  impeded  by  the  lack  of  a  separate  entity  with  a  board  to
coordinate activity, and incentive alignment is attenuated (Williamson, 1991). As before, the
costs stemming from governance misalignment may prompt firms to renegotiate the alliance.
The question that comes to the fore is whether small firms will be more or less able
to improve upon their alliances’ initial governance structures through contractual changes.
We  anticipate  they  will  be  less  likely  to  adapt  their  alliances  for  several  reasons.  The
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able  to  detect  the  need  for  contractual  renegotiation.    Moreover,  small  firms’  lack  of
extensive alliance experience also implies that they may be less able to make other changes
that  are  associated  with  contractual  renegotiation,  such  as  altering  the  scope  of  markets
served or restructuring the collaboration itself. That such changes can be costly and involve
non-trivial risks also suggests that firms without slack financial resources may be less willing
and able to undertake such adjustments in their alliances. Furthermore, the fact that small
firms are often dependent on their alliance partners (e.g., Larson, 1991) also suggests that
they  may  not  wish  to  run  the  risk  of  disrupting  the  relationship  as  it  stands,  even  if
inefficiencies do arise. We therefore wish to test the following two hypotheses to determine if
governance misalignment contributes to contractual renegotiations in alliances and if small
firms experience greater difficulties in managing alliances over time due to this factor.
Hypothesis 2: The likelihood of contractual renegotiation will be positively related to
governance misalignment.
Hypothesis 3: The positive effect of governance misalignment on the likelihood of
contractual renegotiation will be lower for small firms than others.
Contractual Renegotiation as a Manifestation of Hold-Up
Although  firms  may  make  post-formation  governance  decisions  to  alleviate
inefficiencies in alliances, they may also undergo contractual renegotiations because such
changes are imposed upon them in well-defined circumstances. In particular, transaction cost
theory suggests that in bilateral negotiations, a partner may attempt to appropriate value from
the  firm  via  contractual  renegotiations  when  the  firm  has  made  transaction-specific
investments in the alliance. In such situations, the gap between these assets’ first and second
best use values provides motivation to incur ex post costs to renegotiate the alliance’s terms
rather  than  lose  this  difference  for  resources  deployed  to  the  alliance.  The  greater  the
transaction-specific investment, the greater the value the partner is potentially able to capture
in renegotiations. Thus, to the extent that such transfers of value are possible and stimulate
haggling, contractual renegotiations may contribute to, rather than ameliorate, inefficiencies
in strategic alliances. In short, contractual renegotiation can be a manifestation of hold-up
behavior.
As before, the question that arises is whether small firms are more or less sensitive
to such hazards in alliances. To the extent that they have less extensive experience with
interfirm  collaboration,  small  firms’  hazard  mitigating  capabilities,  or  their  abilities  to
collaborate in the face of such hazards, are likely to be lower (Delios & Henisz, 2000). This
suggests that firms will be more exposed to contractual hazards for a given level of asset
specificity. Moreover, when small firms have lower levels of bargaining power in alliances,
the increased expected payoff from appropriation encourages their partners to engage in hold-
up. Thus, we wish to test the following two hypotheses to determine if asset specificity
contributes to contractual renegotiations in alliances and if small firms are more susceptible
to these hazards.
Hypothesis 4: The likelihood of contractual renegotiation will be positively related to
asset specificity.
Hypothesis 5: The positive effect of asset specificity on the likelihood of contractual
renegotiation will be higher for small firms than others.
5Data and methods
Sampling and Survey Design
We used Funk and Scott’s Countries Index – Europe in order to find Spanish firms
engaging  in  collaborative  agreements  and  to  locate  a  target  population.  The  time  period
chosen was 1986-1992, which begins with Spain’s adhesion to the EC and ends with the start
of the Single European Market. We expected that this time period would create external
opportunities and threats posed by the deregulation of markets and heightened competition
that  would  stimulate  inter-firm  collaboration.  Financial  constraints  limited  the  survey  to
Spain, and the fact one of the authors lives in Spain facilitated the follow-up process and
improved  the  chances  for  a  good  response  rate.  A  total  of  674  dyadic  alliances  were
identified, and we focused on those industries that were relatively more active in alliances
and contained 65 percent of the alliances in the overall population contained in the Funk and
Scott database. 
In an effort to ensure the quality of responses, questionnaires were only sent out for
the 189 alliances in which a knowledgeable respondent could be identified. A 48 percent
response rate was attained (i.e., 91 alliances), which is likely due to the effort in identifying
the key informant and the follow-up process, which included additional phone calls (Dillman,
1978). The appropriateness of key informants was revealed by the fact that 91 percent of
respondents  had  been  involved  in  the  alliance  since  it  was  formed  and,  on
average, respondents had been involved in the alliance for 4.9 years. Over 63 percent of the
respondents were directly engaged in the alliance’s negotiation. As an external validity check
on  the  survey  data  for  which  secondary  data  are  available,  we  examined  whether  the
respondent firm is a Spanish company, a subsidiary, or a foreign company, as well as whether
or not the firm is state-owned. Matches were obtained for 96 and 98 percent of the firms for
these questions.
Early versions of the survey were reviewed by business school professors to ensure
the face validity of the survey items. The survey was translated into Spanish and reviewed by
two Spanish-speaking researchers. Following translation, the survey was pre-tested with six
Spanish executives who were experienced in managing alliances. Several changes were made
to the survey during the pre-testing stage. The final Spanish version was reverse-translated
into  English  by  a  person  unfamiliar  with  the  study,  and  there  was  a  high  degree  of
correspondence between the Spanish and English versions.
Although  the  dependent  variable  –  whether  or  not  the  alliance  experienced  a
contractual renegotiation – is an objective indicator of alliance change, we sought to allay
concerns of possible consistency artifacts and common methods bias. Questionnaire items
appeared  so  that  subjective  items  preceded  the  question  on  contractual  renegotiation
(Salancik & Pfeffer, 1977). Furthermore, we employed Harman’s (1967) single-factor test to
determine if a significant amount of common methods variance is evident in the data in the
form of a common underlying factor or a general factor that captures most of the variance in
the data (Podsakoff & Organ, 1986). Unrotated factor analysis using the eigenvalue-greater-
than-one criterion generated four factors, with the first factor capturing only 17.9 percent of
the variance. This analysis therefore indicated that the multivariate findings are not subject to
common methods bias.
We also sought to assess potential nonresponse bias in several ways. We did this by
comparing early and late respondents under the assumption that late respondents are more
similar  to  non-respondents  than  early  respondents  are  to  non-respondents  (Armstrong  &
6Overton, 1977). First, we examined possible differences in the distribution of alliances across
industries for early and late respondents. This analysis yielded an insignificant Chi-square
value of 8.54 (8 d.f.). A similar test statistic comparing respondents and non-respondents was
insignificant  (χ2 =  13.52,  8  d.f.).  We  also  compared  the  size  of  respondents  and  late
respondents, and a one-way ANOVA for firm size across these groups gave an insignificant
F-value of 0.67 (i.e., 86 d.f., p = 0.42). 
Missing data on the variables used in the analysis reduced the final sample size to 71
alliances (for a 38 percent response rate) involving 63 firms. In this sample, six firms were
engaged in more than one alliance. Specifically, four firms were engaged in two alliances,
and  two  firms  had  entered  three  collaborations.  A  supplemental  analysis  using  a  single,
randomly-chosen alliance per firm provided interpretations consistent with those offered in
the  results  and  discussion  sections  below.  Seventeen  alliances  had  terminated,  but  these
collaborations were not excluded from the sample in order to avoid a survival bias.
Measures and Models
Contractual Renegotiation
Respondents  were  asked  whether  the  initial  alliance  contract  was  renegotiated
during the course of the alliance. Thus, the dependent is a binary variable, where Contractual
Renegotiation equals one if the contract was altered, and zero otherwise.
Explanatory Variables 
The hypotheses developed above seek to test whether small firms are more or less
likely to experience contractual renegotiations in alliances as well as isolate the mechanisms
behind such changes for small firms. Small Firm equals 1 if the firm had 500 or fewer
employees,  and  zero  otherwise.  This  definition  is  the  one  used  by  the  US  Commerce
Department (e.g., Roy & Simpson, 1981).
The theory section suggested that governance misalignment may prompt contractual
renegotiation to adapt the alliance in order to rectify inefficiencies owing to excessive or
inadequate governance. To measure governance misalignment, we first estimated a first stage
model  to  compare  firms’  actual  alliance  governance  decisions  with  those  implied  by  the
underlying attributes of the collaboration. To do so, a typology of alliances is needed that
highlights  their  unique  governance  properties.  Distinguishing  equity  from  non-equity
collaborative agreements served this purpose as the former involve more extensive control
rights as well as the introduction of incentive alignment through joint residual claimancy
(e.g., Hennart, 1988). Although consensus is lacking on an alliance typology, this bifurcation
of the governance continuum within the hybrid region is common (e.g., Gulati, 1995, Osborn
& Baughn, 1990; Pisano, 1989). Following the general approach laid out in Anderson (1988)
as well as Silverman, Nickerson, and Freeman (1997), Governance Misalignment was then
calculated  as  1-p  when  the  firm  employed  an  equity  alliance,  and  p  for  non-equity
collaborative agreements, where p is the probability estimate for an equity alliance, which
was modeled as follows:
(1) Equity =  β0 +  β1Asset  Specificity  +  β2Potential  Partners  +  β3Prior  Ties 
+ β4Cross-Border + β5Small Firm + ε.
7Equity  is  equal  to  1  for  equity  alliances,  and  zero  for  non-equity  alliances.  The
governance  choice  model  portrayed  in  equation  (1)  was  estimated  using  a  probit  model.
Although  our  primary  interest  centers  on  the  effects  of  governance  misalignment  on  the
likelihood  of  contractual  renegotiation,  we  will  first  discuss  the  regressors  constituting
the first-stage model.
Asset specificity is the first regressor in the model and, according to transaction cost
research, it should also be a key determinant of firms’ governance choices in alliances. Based
on transaction cost theory’s prediction that opportunism poses greater risks to collaborators in
the  presence  of  transaction-specific  investment  (e.g.,  Williamson,  1991),  and  that  the
incentives and controls offered by equity structures can mitigate these hazards, we anticipate
a  positive  coefficient  for  asset  specificity.  In  the  second  stage  model  containing  the
antecedents of contractual renegotiation, asset specificity also appears since asset specificity
will influence a firm’s willingness to bear the costs of contractual change in both equity and
non-equity alliances.
Asset Specificity was measured as an unweighted index based on four indicators
reflecting the firm’s transaction-specific investment in the alliance. Each of the following
items  were  measured  on  a  five-point  scale  ranging  from  negligible  to  substantial:  “Our
investment  in  dedicated  personnel  specific  to  this  venture  is…,”  “Our  investment  in
dedicated facilities to this venture is…,” “If we decided to stop this venture, the difficulty we
would have in redeploying our people and facilities presently serving the venture to other
uses would be…,” and “If this venture were to dissolve, our non-recoverable investments in
equipment, people, etc. would be…” (e.g., Anderson & Weitz, 1992; Parkhe, 1993). The
asset  specificity  measure  had  a  Chronbach  alpha  of  0.74,  which  indicated  satisfactory
reliability (Nunally, 1978). 
The  Potential Partners variable  captures  the  number  of  other  available  alliance
partners and, therefore, is a negative indicator of small numbers bargaining. As the number of
potential partners declines, contractual hazards such as moral hazard and hold-up increase
since the difficulty of switching partners also increases (Williamson, 1975). If the control and
incentive features of equity alliances ameliorate these hazards, a negative parameter estimate
should result. In a study of alliances in the US biotechnology industry, Pisano (1989) reports
that  firms  turn  to  equity  alliances  rather  than  non-equity  agreements  as  the  number  of
potential partners diminishes. Potential Partners was measured on a four-point scale based
on the number of other firms with the necessary skills to carry out the partner’s activity.
The Prior Ties variable accounts for whether or not the parties to the collaboration
had  prior  alliances  with  each  other.  Firms  who  have  a  collaborative  history  together  are
thought to exhibit greater trust (Gulati, 1995), which can mitigate the threat of opportunism
and the need for more complex governance arrangements. Prior ties can also lead to the
development  of  collaborative  routines  that  substitute  for  formal  governance  mechanisms
(e.g., Dyer & Singh, 1998). Thus, prior research on alliances suggests a negative coefficient
for prior ties in equation (1). Prior Ties equals one if the firms had a prior collaborative
agreement, and zero otherwise.
For similar reasons, a variable indicating whether or not the alliance is cross-border
or  domestic  was  included  in  the  specification.  Gulati  (1995)  suggests  that  cross-border
alliances are more likely to require the controls and incentives provided by equity because
character-based  trust  emerges  more  readily  between  socially-similar  firms,  reputational
consequences of opportunism are more severe in the domestic setting, and more information is
available on domestic firms. Thus, a positive coefficient is expected for the Cross-Border
8variable, which takes on a value of one if the two partners are from different countries, and
zero otherwise. Finally, the control for firm size was introduced into the first-stage model. This
variable accounts for parent firm resources and other potential influences at the firm level.
Specification of the Contractual Renegotiation Model
Having  discussed  the  theoretical  variables  of  interest  that  may  explain  post-
formation  contractual  changes  in  alliances,  we  can  specify  the  second-stage  model  as
follows: 
(2) Contractual Renegotiation = γ0 + γ1Small Firm + γ2Governance Misalignment + γ3Asset
Specificity + γ4Small Firm x Governance Misfit + γ5 Small
Firm  x  Asset  Specificity  +  γ6Contractual  Safeguards  +
γ7Cross-Border  +  γ8Environmental  Change  +  γ9Strategic
Change + γ10Alliance Age + ε.
Based on the hypotheses discussed above, it is ambiguous whether the propensity to
contractual change is higher or lower for small firms in general. However, if small firms are
less able to adapt alliances over time and are more susceptible to hold-up for a given level of
transaction-specific investment, then γ4<0 and γ5>0. 
Although  our  objective  was  to  develop  a  parsimonious  model  of  contractual
renegotiation  in  alliances  to  examine  the  experiences  of  small  firms,  we  also  sought  to
control  for  other  initial  conditions  and  ex post changes  that  may  have  a  bearing  on  the
likelihood  of  contractual  renegotiation.  First,  we  controlled  for  the  level  of  contractual
safeguards in the alliance contract. Such provisions are apt to be used when firms make
transaction-specific investments in alliances, and they also may leave less room for hold-up
behavior. The measure we used for contractual safeguards was developed by Parkhe (1993),
who  conducted  a  computer-aided  search  of  the  legal  literature  to  create  a  checklist  of
contractual provisions. Respondents indicated which of the following safeguards appeared in
their alliance agreement: (1) periodic written reports of all relevant transactions; (2) prompt
written notice of any departures from the agreement; (3) the right to examine and audit all
relevant records through a firm of CPAs; (4) designation of certain information as proprietary
and  subject  to  confidentiality  provisions  of  the  contract;  (5)  non-use  of  proprietary
information even after termination of agreement; (6) termination of agreement; (7) arbitration
clauses; and (8) lawsuit provisions. These safeguards were arrayed in increasing order of
stringency (as shown), and the Contractual Safeguards variable was calculated as follows:
(3) Contractual Safeguards =
where Di equals i if the ith safeguard was employed, and zero otherwise. In other
words, Di equals one if the first safeguard was employed, zero otherwise; two if the second
safeguard was employed, zero otherwise; and so on. The summation term therefore ranges
from 0 to 36, and the division by 36 yields a measure ranging from zero to one. When the
variable takes on a value of zero, none of the eight safeguards listed above are in place,
whereas when the variable assumes its maximum value of one, all of the eight safeguards
appear in the alliance agreement.
We also introduced a control for whether the collaboration was a domestic alliance






i= ∑ ,that cross-border alliances may benefit from additional controls, as noted above, and that
instability in general is regarded as a defining feature of international alliances (e.g., Inkpen
&  Beamish,  1997).  Prior  research  on  the  termination  of  cross-border  collaborations  has
yielded somewhat mixed evidence (e.g., Park & Ungson, 1997), but we sought to determine
if cross-border alliances are more susceptible to instability in the form of contractual changes.
In addition to these variables that control for characteristics of the alliance and its
initial design, we also sought to account for ex post contingencies that might reflect such
conditions and also be related to the likelihood of alterations in alliances’ contracts. For
instance, models of alliance evolution note that changes in an alliance’s environment can
trigger adjustments in the collaboration to restore initial conditions of equity and efficiency
(e.g., Ariño and de la Torre , 1998; Doz, 1996; Zajac & Olsen, 1993). Changes in a parent
firm’s strategy can similarly lead firms to revisit the initial agreement (e.g., Koza & Lewin,
1998; Kumar & Nti, 1998). Respondents indicated whether or not there had been any changes
in  the  venture’s  environment  (i.e.,  Environmental Change)  or  in  the  firm’s  strategy  (i.e.,
Strategic Change)  that  substantially  affected  the  venture.  Finally,  to  account  for  other
influences at the alliance level and recognize that older alliances might be more likely to be
adjusted  simply  due  to  the  passage  of  time,  we  introduced  a  control  for  alliance  age,
measured in years.
Results
Descriptive statistics and a correlation matrix for variables appearing in the first
stage  governance  choice  model  can  be  found  in  Table  1.  Forty-five  percent  of  the
collaborative  agreements  involved  equity,  and  one-fifth  of  the  collaborators  had  prior
alliances with their partners. Most of the alliances, 84 percent, were between firms from
different countries. Slightly under half of the firms were small firms, and these firms tended
to make more transaction-specific investments in their alliances (p<0.01). While small firms
might be expected to economize on search costs in establishing alliances, they are no more
likely to take on domestic partners than larger organizations, which might be attributable to
the  economic  threats  and  opportunities  posed  by  economic  integration  in  Europe.  Taken
together,  the  correlations  among  the  variables  are  generally  modest,  and  the  maximum
variance inflation factor (VIF) for the variables in the first-stage model is only 1.15.
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix (Governance Choice Model Variables)a
Variable Mean S.D. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(1) Equity Alliance 0.45 0.50 ––
(2) Asset Specificity 9.21 3.35 0.32** ––
(3) Potential Partners 2.83 1.03 -0.06 -0.06 ––
(4) Prior Ties 0.20 0.40 0.24* 0.06 0.30** ––
(5) Cross-Border 0.84 0.37 -0.08 0.04 0.02 0.05 ––
(6) Small Firm 0.47 0.50 -0.02 0.31** -0.10 -0.16 -0.03
aN=80. † p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
10Estimation  results  for  the  governance  choice  model  used  to  calculate  the
Governance Misalignment variable appear in Table 2. The model is highly significant on an
overall basis (p<0.001). Consistent with the predictions of transaction cost economics, firms
turn to equity alliances over non-equity collaborative agreements when making transaction-
specific investments in their collaborations (p<0.01) and when a small number of alternative
partners are available (p<0.01). Interestingly, firms with prior ties use equity alliances rather
than non-equity alliances, and cross-border alliances are no more or less likely to implement
the controls and incentives offered by equity structures. Both of these findings run counter to
trust-based explanations of firms’ governance choices (c.f., Gulati, 1995). After controlling
for other influences at the transaction level, small firms are no more prone to use equity or
non-equity alliances than other firms.
Table 2. Governance Choice Modelb















bN=80. Standard errors appear in parentheses. † p<0.10, * p<0.05, 
** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
Table  3  presents  descriptive  statistics  and  a  correlation  matrix  for  the  variables
appearing in the contractual renegotiation model. One-fifth of sampled alliances underwent a
contractual  change.  Small  firms  were  no  more  or  less  likely  to  experience  contractual
changes than others (χ2=0.51). Although small firms are apt to make greater transaction-
specific investments in their alliances (p<0.01), they do not tend to experience governance
misalignments  more  frequently  than  larger  firms.  Chi-square  tests  and  two-sample  t-tests
indicate that firm size is not related to any of the other explanatory variables either. Thus,
although small firms tend to make greater transaction-specific investments in their alliances,
they do not tend to include greater safeguards in their collaborative agreements to restrict
their partners. 
11Table 3. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix (Contractual Renegotiation Model Variables)c
Variable Mean S.D. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(1) Contractual 
Renegotiation 0.20 0.40 ––
(2) Small Firm 0.45 0.50 0.09 ––
(3) Governance 
Misalignment 0.39 0.20 0.20† -0.01 ––
(4) Asset Specificity 9.18 3.47 0.31** 0.30* -0.12 ––
(5) Contractual 
Safeguards 0.46 0.33 -0.09 -0.09 -0.06 0.16 ––
(6) Cross-Border 0.83 0.38 0.13 -0.08 -0.15 0.05 0.16 ––
(7) Environmental 
Change 0.20 0.40 0.29* -0.09 -0.04 0.14 0.23† 0.13 ––
(8) Strategic Change 0.10 0.30 0.31** -0.11 0.13 -0.07 0.15 0.15 0.19 ––
(9) Alliance Age 3.89 4.79 0.32** -0.14 -0.003 0.05 0.19 0.16 0.35** 0.37**
cN=71. † p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
Of the firms that did go through a contractual renegotiation, the mean alliance age
was 7.3, whereas the average age of other alliances was 3.1 years (p<0.01). Twenty percent
of  the  alliances  were  subject  to  an  environmental  change  that  affected  the  collaboration,
whereas only ten percent of the alliances witnessed a strategic change by the parent firms.
The greater the age of the alliance, the more likely that strategic or environmental changes
would occur (both p<0.01), and these changes make it more likely for parent firms to find
themselves renegotiating the alliance contract (p<0.05 and p<0.01, respectively). However,
the significant correlations among many of the explanatory variables indicate the importance
of  using  multivariate  methods  to  isolate  the  antecedents  of  contractual  renegotiations  in
alliances.  These  correlations  also  indicate  the  possibility  of  multicollinearity  problems,
however. The maximum VIF for the direct effects for the variables appearing in Table 3 is
only 1.30, yet the incorporation of the interaction terms raises the maximum VIF to 15.84.
Accordingly, we standardized the Governance Misalignment and Asset Specificity variables
prior  to  forming  the  multiplicative  terms,  which  reduced  the  maximum  VIF  to  a  more
acceptable level of 2.53.
Multivariate estimation results for the contractual renegotiation models appear in
Table 4. Model I presents a specification containing the control variables along with the firm
size indicator. Model II augments this model by including the direct effects of Governance
Misalignment and Asset Specificity. Finally, Model III includes the two interaction terms. A
log likelihood value is provided for each Model k (i.e., L(βk)), where k = 1, 2, or 3, to draw
comparisons across the three models. All three models demonstrate satisfactory fit (p<0.01,
p<0.001, and p<0.001, respectively). Likelihood ratio tests also indicate that Models II and
III  improve  upon  the  baseline  specification  in  Model  I  (χ2=13.58,  p<0.01  and  χ2=23.24,
12p<0.001, respectively). Finally, incorporation of the interaction terms in Model III leads to
better model fit relative to the direct-effects only specification of Model II (χ2=9.66, p<0.01).
Table 4. Contractual Renegotiation Modeld
Variable Model I Model II Model III
Intercept -1.77* -1.59*- 3.28†
(0.71) (0.75) -(1.71)
Contractual Safeguards -1.58* -2.48* -4.05*
(0.77) (1.06) (1.60)
Cross-Border 0.47 0.42 0.25
(0.67) (0.74) (0.92)
Environmental Change 1.05* 0.77 1.96*
(0.51) (0.61) (0.98)
Strategic Change 1.22† 1.71* 2.23†
(0.63) (0.75) (1.35)
Alliance Age 0.10 0.15† 0.16
(0.08) (0.09) (0.19)
Small Firm 0.65 -0.25 1.87
(0.43) (0.58) (1.39)
Governance Misalignment 0.64* 3.67*
–– (0.32) (1.50)
Asset Specificity 1.03** 4.45*
–– (0.39) (2.18)
Small Firm x Governance Misalignment -4.05*
–– –– (1.70)
Small Firm x Asset Specificity -3.34
–– –– (2.07)
χ2 49.39** 34.80*** 25.14***
Log Likelihood, L(βk) -24.19 -17.40 -12.57
-2[L(βI)-L(βk)] –– 13.58** 23.24***
-2[L(βII)-L(βIII)] –– –– 9.66**
dN=71. Standard errors appear in parentheses. The Governance Misalignment and Asset Specificity variables
have been standardized. L(βk) refers to the log likelihood value for model k. † p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***
p<0.001. 
13The parameter estimate for the Small Firm variable is positive in Model I, but only
reaches  significance  at  the  0.13  level.  If  Governance Misalignment is  included  in  this
specification, the parameter estimate is still positive and reaches significance at the 0.09
level,  providing  modest  evidence  at  best  that  small  firms  are  more  apt  to  experience
contractual  renegotiations  in  alliances.  However,  the  fact  that  firm  size  matters  can  be
demonstrated more convincingly using the specification in Model III. A likelihood ratio test
that drops the direct effects of the Small Firm variable as well as its interactions produces a
chi-square  value  of  9.83  (p=0.02),  indicating  that  firm  size  does  influence  contractual
changes in alliances, but perhaps in a more complex fashion than in the direct, linear fashion
as specified in Model I.
Given the negative correlation between firm size and asset specificity noted above, it
is perhaps not surprising that inclusion of the Governance Misalignment and Asset Specificity
regressors changes the results for firm size. The parameter estimate changes signs and is no
longer  significant  at  any  reasonable  level,  but  the  likelihood  of  contractual  changes  is
positively related to asset specificity (p<0.01). To illustrate the practical significance of these
relationships, we bifurcated the sample based on firms’ transaction-specific investments at
the median value. For small firms that did not make transaction-specific investments in their
alliances, the incidence of contractual changes is 8.33 percent. The incidence of contractual
changes  increases  to  36.84  for  small  firms  that  did  make  significant  transaction-specific
investments in their collaborative agreements, which compares to 7.6 percent for large firms.
Model II also indicates that the likelihood of contractual renegotiation is positively related to
governance misalignment (p<0.05) and its attendant inefficiencies. This underscores the point
made early on that contractual renegotiation may be beneficial to collaborators by enhancing
the efficiency of collaborative relationships, but it can also be a manifestation of hold-up in
alliances.
The  interaction  terms  appearing  in  Model  III  demonstrate  a  negative  interaction
between  governance  misalignment  and  the  Small Firm variable  (p<0.05).  This  result  is
consistent with the argument that smaller firms will be less able to adapt alliances over time
and thus bear the inefficiencies associated with governance misalignment. Larger firms are in
a better position to exercise discretion and adapt their relationships over time. To explore
whether the effects of excessive and inadequate governance are equivalent, we separated the
Governance Misalignment variable  into  two  components  –  governance  overfit  (i.e.,
Governance Overfit = 1-p for equity alliances and 0 for nonequity alliances) and governance
underfit (i.e., Governance Underfit = p for nonequity alliances and 0 for equity alliances,
where Governance Misalignment = Governance Overfit + Governance Underfit) – but there
was no evidence that the effects differed. Notably, no positive interaction is present for firm
size and asset specificity. The results discussed above indicate that while firms are not more
exposed to hold-up problems for a given level of asset specificity, they tend to make greater
transaction-specific investments that bring about contractual changes.
Finally, the control variables deserve some comment. All three models indicate that
the extensiveness of contractual safeguards relates negatively to the likelihood of contractual
changes (p<0.05). Alliances with less complete contracts are those that are the most likely to
be renegotiated. However, none of the models suggests that cross-border collaborations are
any  more  or  less  likely  to  be  renegotiated  than  domestic  collaborations.  There  is  mixed
evidence that changes in the venture’s environment prompt contractual changes (p<0.05 in
Models I and III), and it is apparent that changes in a firm’s strategy often lead to contractual
renegotiation in its alliances (p<0.05 in Model II and p<0.10 in Models I and III).
14In order to explore whether small firms are any more or less affected by these ex
post contingencies in alliances, we interacted the Small Firm variable with the Environmental
Change and Strategic Change variables, but no significant interactions were found. Thus, the
effects of these ex post contingencies generalize to small firms and others in alliances, and no
differences are evident that would suggest that small firms are more or less sensitive to such
changes. Similarly, the effects of contractual safeguards, alliance age, and whether or not the
alliance was a cross-border collaboration did not differ for small firms and others.
Discussion
Our  findings  demonstrate  the  relevance  of  studying  the  evolution  of  strategic
alliances, or the changes and events that occur after an alliance has been set up but before it
has been terminated. Historically, alliance research has focused on the formation of alliances
and, more recently, has given more attention to alliance termination (e.g., Park & Kim, 1997).
Because  alliances  hold  out  many  opportunities  for  small  firms  (Larson,  1991)  and  also
present  serious  challenges  to  them  (e.g.,  Alvarez  &  Barney,  2001),  it  is  important  to
understand how small firms manage all of the stages of inter-firm collaboration that must be
managed effectively for alliances to yield the greatest results (e.g., Deeds & Hill, 1999; Doz
& Hamel, 1998; Niederkofler, 1991; Weaver & Dickson, 1998).
Our models focus on just one type of post-formation change that takes place in
alliances, contractual renegotiations. Future research, therefore, could consider other types of
post-formation changes in alliances and ideally would develop a taxonomy of them in order
for managers to understand their alternatives and the tradeoffs involved. Some changes, such
as changing a joint venture’s board or its scope, will tend to be more formal, whereas other
changes in collaborative agreements may be more informal in nature. 
Based on the empirical results we present, it is interesting to note that in many
respects  small  firms’  experiences  in  alliances  parallel  those  of  larger  organizations.  For
example, although instability has been regarded as a distinguishing feature of cross-border
collaborations,  we  find  that  such  alliances  are  no  more  likely  to  experience  contractual
adjustments than others, and the effects do not differ across small firms and others. Further,
as noted above, contractual renegotiations tend to stem from strategic changes surrounding
the  alliance  and  from  possibilities  for  appropriating  value  due  to  transaction-specific
investments and contractual incompleteness, but the effects of these factors also do not differ
across small firms and others. By controlling for relevant alliance design variables, attributes
of the collaborative agreement, and changes surrounding the collaboration, we are also able
to show that small firms are no more or less likely to experience contractual renegotiations in
general. Thus, in broad terms, the results point to the value of contingency perspectives in the
study of entrepreneurial firms in alliances, as well as research designs such as ours that
enable the isolation of small firms’ unique experiences.
More  specifically,  our  results  indicate  the  value  of  taking  transaction  cost
perspectives of firms’ governance decisions into the post-formation setting. By maintaining
the  fundamental  proposition  of  discriminating  alignment  while  relaxing  assumptions
concerning the selection environment (Williamson, 1991), we allow for managerial discretion
and the possibility that firms can adapt their relationships and refine the governance of their
strategic alliances through contractual renegotiations. Although firms tend to respond to the
inefficiencies associated with governance misalignment, it is apparent that small firms are
less likely to make contractual adjustments in their alliances in the face of such inefficiencies.
Extensions to the present study could consider the specific attributes of small firms, whether
15less extensive alliance experience or the lack of other resources, that account for their lower
degree of responsiveness to governance misalignment. Clinical research would be helpful in
this effort, allowing researchers to examine situations in which firms attempt to adapt their
relationships yet fail and to sort out why such changes are difficult for some firms.
Despite the fact that small firms will often lack bargaining power and extensive
alliance experience that can provide hazard-mitigating capabilities, the results indicate that
they are no more exposed to contractual hazards than other firms, for a given level of asset
specificity. A firm’s transaction-specific investment in alliances emerges as a key variable
affecting  the  dynamics  of  collaborations,  however.  In  simple  models  without  the  asset
specificity variable, there is modest evidence that small firms are more likely to renegotiate
alliances, yet inclusion of the asset specificity variable indicates that this variable, rather than
firm  size  per se,  contributes  to  contractual  renegotiation.  Thus,  while  contractual
renegotiation may be used to mitigate inefficiencies due to governance misalignment, it also
may exacerbate inefficiencies due to opportunities for hold-up. While small firms are no
more exposed to such contractual hazards for a given level of asset specificity, they do tend to
make more transaction-specific investment in alliances without incorporating commensurate
contractual safeguards into their collaborative agreements. The completeness of the alliance
contract  as  well  as  the  level  of  transaction-specific  investment  both  in  turn  relate  to  the
likelihood of contractual renegotiations.
In attempting to bring transaction cost theory into the post-formation setting and
examine the experiences of small firms as their alliances evolve, our study has limitations
that present additional opportunities for future research. First, we suspect that extensions may
be able to isolate other antecedents of contractual renegotiations. In contrast to our models,
which draw primarily on transaction cost theory, other perspectives may prove useful in this
regard. For example, research drawing upon game theory, property rights literature, agency
theory, and other perspectives may be fruitful in identifying other factors that stimulate post-
formation changes in alliances. Indeed, recent conceptual and qualitative studies on alliance
evolution have developed models that are quite complex, so studies with larger samples and
more extensive survey data may be able to capture more of this richness.
In common with most studies of alliances, our research involved collecting data on
one firm per alliance. Collecting sufficient data on both sides of alliance dyads is challenging,
but  it  would  allow  for  a  more  complete  assessment  of  partners’  renegotiation  efforts  by
considering  parties’  differing  perceptions,  roles,  and  outcomes.  Moreover,  because  our
sample is restricted to alliances with two partners, extensions could examine how alliance
dynamics play out in collaborations with more partners and whether the current findings
generalize more broadly.
Our models are also limited by their cross-sectional construction based on survey
data.  Thus,  future  research  with  access  to  longitudinal  data  will  be  able  to  address  new
questions concerning temporal changes in governance misalignment and other covariates, the
timing  of  contractual  renegotiations  or  other  types  of  change  in  strategic  alliances,  and
repeated changes of a specific type in collaborations. Recent conceptual research on alliance
evolution has proposed frameworks including feedback loops (e.g., Ariño & de la Torre,
1998, Zajac & Olsen, 1993), so datasets with access to longitudinal information would be
helpful in testing these predictions on the causes and consequences of alliance dynamics.
Finally, our study ultimately is silent on the performance implications of ex post
changes in alliances. Although indirect inferences may be made concerning efficiency from
the linkages between governance misalignment and contractual renegotiations or between
16asset specificity and contractual renegotiations, it would be attractive to study more directly
the implications of contractual renegotiations and other post-formation changes in alliances.
Future research could examine how such changes affect the longevity of alliances, under
what circumstances alliance adaptation is beneficial or unfavorable vis-à-vis different types
of  termination,  and  how  such  changes  shape  collaborators’  performance  outcomes.  Such
work could also draw conclusions on the relative importance of different alliance life-cycle
stages. Relative to other areas of research on alliance formation and termination, the topic of
alliance dynamics remains relatively uncharted territory and presents many new avenues for
inquiry in entrepreneurship research.
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